Article: Manolescu, Beth I. “Religious Reasons for Campbell’s View of Emotional Appeals in Philosophy of Rhetoric.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 37 (2207): 159–80.
Summary: First, . . . I argue that he [George Campbell] offers a theory of inventing emotional appeals analogous to a classical ‘‘place’’ system of invention. Second, this article complements broad explanations of Campbell’s view of emotional appeals. . . . Campbell’s religious concerns were inextricably linked with concerns about social and political order. Third, this article complements research on the sources of his rhetorical theory. . . . Given Campbell’s vocation and publications, his religious purposes ought not to be discounted.8 Thus this study highlights the need to study theories of rhetoric in the contexts of an author’s ‘‘other’’ works and practical concerns.
I first detail Campbell’s arguments for a moderate preaching style and for a view of the Gospels as undesigned testimony—as reports of matters of fact—that reveal God’s truths. I then argue that these positions shape Campbell’s conception of emotional appeals as inventible and intimately connected with appeals to reason, as well as his assumptions that passion and reason are universal, passive faculties of mind (162).
Area Cluster: Theory, History
Methodology: rhetorical analysis, history, historiography
Most Valuable Citations:
-George Campbell The Philosophy of Rhetoric.
-Walzer, Arthur E. ‘‘Campbell on the Passions: A Rereading of the Philosophy of Rhetoric.’’ Quarterly Journal of Speech 85 (1999): 72–85.
Money Quotes:
Campbell’s theory of mind helps to explain why he can abandon neither reason nor passion. He cannot abandon reason given his view of the faculty as a fundamental ability to classify sense perceptions—one that humans share with animals even though humans are superior to animals, and some humans are superior to other humans (Philosophy 48). He cannot abandon passion given his view that passion is the mover to action (Philosophy 78; ‘‘Pulpit’’ 463–64). But if Campbell designs a rhetorical theory with the needs of preachers in mind, then we may ask what practical circumstances motivated his theoretical choices (163).
Campbell’s call for order in the mind and his concern that enthusiasm disrupts this order is a counterpart to the moderate fear that evangelism would revive fanaticism and disorder; his preoccupation with preaching may be explained in part by a desire to regenerate morality to maintain national order (Sher 31–2, 44). Again, we see that Campbell puts a premium upon reason in preaching (168).
Campbell wants to maintain a need for scripture—to argue that religious truths exist in the Bible and not just in the ‘‘book of Nature,’’ for example (Lectures 357) (168).
Campbell wants to constrain interpretations of scripture. The mistaken belief that reason can generate truths has, for Campbell, led people to look to the Bible to confirm their beliefs—or, put differently, to invent arguments to support false doctrine—rather than to simply see the truths revealed there (169).
The following explication of Campbell’s conception of emotional appeals in Philosophy of Rhetoric highlights three main points. First, both reason and emotion are relatively passive faculties—an appealing theoretical position given Campbell’s desire to constrain scriptural interpretations. Second, emotional appeals are inventible or designed—not unrehearsed or spontaneous externalizations of internal states that may promote disorder. This position helps rhetors design emotional appeals tempered by reason since their design involves marshalling evidence. It also helps rhetors to distinguish themselves from those who put a premium on emotional displays. Further, it helps to bolster the authority of revealed religion; God speaks to humans through the Bible rather than through the enthusiastic, spontaneous ravings of an unsound mind. Third, both the invention and presentation of emotional appeals are practically inseparable from reason. Thus rhetors may avoid the extremes of lukewarmness and enthusiasm, and work to maintain religious, social, and political order (171).